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Beyond Levels of Scrutiny:
Windsor and “Bare Desire
to Harm”
Andrew Koppelman†
Abstract
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court left many people
unsatisfied when it failed to identify the level of scrutiny to apply to
laws that classify by sexual orientation. That question, however, was
not even presented. DOMA makes no reference to sexual orientation,
but it does speak of “man” and “woman.” It classifies on the basis of
sex. Sex-based classifications are presumptively unconstitutional. The
Court avoided this rationale for its result, probably because it did not
want to reach the question of whether states could deny same-sex
couples the right to marry.
The equal protection analysis upon which the Court did rely, the
lesser-used “bare desire to harm” doctrine, had nothing to do with levels
of scrutiny. It looked past that heuristic device to the underlying
purposes of equal protection. This was a rare but appropriate response
to an unusual kind of law, one that singles out a particular class and
imposes an unprecedentedly broad disability upon it.
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Introduction
It is a truth universally acknowledged that the big question the
Supreme Court evaded in United States v. Windsor,1 which invalidated
section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act2 (DOMA), is this: what
is the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
orientation?3
But it is not true. That question was not even presented in
Windsor. DOMA did not classify on the basis of sexual orientation.
Lower courts were wrong to claim that it did.
DOMA declared, in pertinent part, that the word “marriage,”
wherever it appears in the United States Code, “means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”4 It made
no reference to sexual orientation, but it did speak of “man” and
“woman.” It classified on the basis of sex. Sex-based classifications are
presumptively unconstitutional. The Court avoided this rationale for
its result, probably because it did not want to reach the question of
whether states could deny same-sex couples the right to marry. The
reasoning the Court did rely on, however, was correct and sufficient to
dispose of the case before it.
The equal protection analysis upon which the Court relied had
nothing to do with levels of scrutiny.5 It looked past that heuristic
device to the underlying purposes of equal protection.6 This was a rare
but appropriate response to an unusual kind of law, one that singles
out a particular class and imposes an unprecedentedly broad disability
upon it.
Part I of this Article explains why DOMA did not classify on the
basis of sexual orientation. Part II explains that it did classify on the
basis of sex. Part III examines the cases in which the Court invalidated
a statute without expressly elevating the level of scrutiny. One such
class of cases is that in which the statute targets a narrowly defined
group and then imposes on it disabilities that are so broad and
undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationship to any legitimate
1.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

2.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).

3.

See, e.g., Mike Dorf, A Publicity Update and Then Three Thoughts on
Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Windsor, Dorf on Law (June 28, 2013, 10:37
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/06/a-publicity-update-and-thenthree.html; Ariel Chesler, Some Justice for the Second Sexuality,
Huffington Post (June 27, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/ariel-chesler/some-justice-for-the-seco_b_3509168.html.

4.

1 U.S.C. § 7.

5.

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96.

6.

Id. at 2693.
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governmental interest. Part IV argues that DOMA was such a statute.
Part V examines the curious place of federalism in the Windsor
Court’s reasoning.

I.

It’s Not a Sexual Orientation Classification

Many courts have now held that laws denying same-sex couples the
right to marry classify on the basis of sexual orientation. Such laws, the
courts say, therefore present the question of whether classification on
the basis of sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny.7
DOMA, which withheld federal recognition from same-sex marriages
for all purposes throughout the United States Code, similarly was held
by lower courts to classify on the basis of sexual orientation.8 The
Obama Administration reached the same conclusion,9 and that position
was urged upon the Court in many of the briefs.10
7.

See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440–41 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he marriage
statutes, realistically viewed, operate clearly and directly to impose
different treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual
orientation.”), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. Const.
art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013); see also Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866–
67 (8th Cir. 2006) (assuming that a challenge to a state marriage statute
turns on whether homosexuality is a suspect classification).

8.

Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (assuming
without argument that DOMA classifies on the basis of sexual
orientation), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Pedersen v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310–33 (D. Conn. 2012)
(same); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (“DOMA makes distinctions between legally married
couples, by granting benefits to opposite-sex married couples but denying
benefits to same-sex married couples. Accordingly, DOMA treats gay and
lesbian individuals differently on the basis of their sexual orientation.”).
An exception is Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387
(D. Mass. 2010), which declined to address the level of scrutiny because
the statute was invalid as lacking a rational basis.

9.

See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to
Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag223.html (assuming without argument that DOMA classified on the basis
of sexual orientation).

10.

See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at
15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 26, 2013) (No. 12307); Brief for the United States on the Merits Question at 18, United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307); Brief of
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging
Affirmance on the Merits at 1, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307).
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The objection that devastates this reasoning is simple. Respondent
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives
(BLAG) argued in a footnote in its brief on the merits in Windsor that
“DOMA does not classify based on a married couple’s sexual
orientation” because a gay person could enter into a different-sex union
that would fall within DOMA’s definition of marriage.11
BLAG was right.12 To see why it was right, consider what it means
for a law to classify on the basis of a trait.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”13 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision as prohibiting arbitrary discrimination or treating similar
things dissimilarly.14 Without more, this produces a very deferential
standard of judicial review. “The general rule is that legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”15 Laws
that classify based on “race, alienage, or national origin,” on the other
hand, “are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they
are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”16 Almost no
legislation has been able to satisfy that test, whereas almost any
legislation can meet “minimal scrutiny,” which asks whether the statute
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. In the 1970s, the
Court devised a third, intermediate level of scrutiny: classifications
based on sex or illegitimacy are what has been infelicitously called
“quasi-suspect”; they “will survive equal protection scrutiny to the
extent they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest.”17
This isn’t strict scrutiny, but it comes close. The Court has held that
“the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the
basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly
11.

See Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 25 n.7, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Jan. 22, 2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter BLAG
Brief].

12.

It is right about the character of the classification. Whether there is
impermissible discrimination is a different question. A law may be
impermissibly discriminatory even if it does not facially classify on a suspect
or quasi-suspect basis. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

13

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

14.

I am not endorsing this approach to equal protection. For my critique,
see Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social
Equality (1996). This Article stipulates existing doctrine and works
within its parameters.

15.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

16.

Id.

17.

Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
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persuasive justification for the classification.”18 “The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”19
Everything turns on whether the law employs a suspect or quasisuspect classification. How do we know when that is happening? A
classification is based on trait T if it requires state officials, in
allocating rights and burdens, to determine in specific cases whether T
is present. Legal consequences must turn on the presence or absence of
T. That is what it means to classify.
The principle should be obvious. Evidently it is not. So here are
some examples.
In Brown v. Board of Education,20 the state had to determine the
race of students in order to decide what school to place them in.21 That
is how we know that the state was using a race-based classification.
McLaughlin v. Florida22 unanimously invalidated a criminal statute
prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in and
occupying the same room at night.23 The Court found it “readily
apparent” that the statute “treats the interracial couple made up of a
white person and a Negro differently than it does any other couple.”24
The race of the defendant was an essential element of the crime that the
prosecution had to prove.25 Justice Stewart, concurring, declared that “it
is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution
which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of
the actor.”26
The principle works similarly with sex discrimination. Frontiero v.
Richardson27 invalidated a law that automatically allowed male
members of the Air Force to claim their wives as dependents and
18.

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 531 (1996) (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government
action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that
action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

19.

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.

20.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

21.

Id. at 487–88.

22.

379 U.S. 184 (1964).

23.

Id. at 184.

24.

Id. at 188.

25.

See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 538, 542 (1885) (“To be a negro
is not a crime; to marry a white woman is not a crime; but to be a negro,
and being a negro, to marry a white woman is a felony; therefore, it is
essential to the crime that the accused shall be a negro—unless he is a
negro he is guilty of no offence.”).

26.

379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring).

27.

411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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therefore receive housing and medical benefits but required female
members to prove that their husbands depended on them for more than
half their support.28 If Sharron Frontiero had been male, she would have
received the benefits.29 In order to determine her rights, the Air Force
had to determine whether she was male or female. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld30 struck down a provision of the Social Security Act that
allowed a widowed mother, but not a widowed father, to receive
survivor’s benefits based on the earnings of the deceased spouse.31 If
Stephen Wiesenfeld had been female, he would have received the
benefits he was denied.32 Once more, administrators had to determine
whether he was male or female. The Court later referred to “the simple
test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner
which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”33
The state is not classifying on the basis of T if it classifies on the
basis of X, which overlaps very largely with T. Pregnancy-based
classifications are not sex-based classifications, even though only
women can become pregnant.34 In order to decide whether a person’s
medical conditions arise from pregnancy, the state does not need to
decide whether that person is male or female. The degree of overlap
doesn’t matter. The test looks at the classification that appears within
the statute, not at its external effects.
Nor is the question but-for causation—whether a person would not
be adversely affected by the statute if she did not belong to a protected
class. Being female is a but-for cause of pregnancy. The question is
whether the person administering the law is instructed by the law to
classify on the basis of the characteristic and to allocate rights and
duties on the basis of that classification.
28.

Id. at 680.

29.

See id.

30.

420 U.S. 636 (1975).

31.

Id. at 653.

32.

Id. at 640–41.

33.

L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)
(quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1170 (1971))
(holding that Title VII prohibits assessment of larger pension fund
contributions from female than from male employees, even though as a
class women do live longer than men).

34.

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974); see also Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 505 U.S. 263, 271, 272 n.3 (1993)
(citing Geduldig with approval). I am not here endorsing Geduldig’s
holding that there is no sex discrimination. See Andrew Koppelman,
The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 60
(2002). However, it is correct that pregnancy discrimination does not
require any state official to classify persons on the basis of sex.
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So here is the problem. Neither a state law denying same-sex
couples the right to marry nor DOMA require any official to determine
anyone’s sexual orientation. Some laws do.35 Under the military’s nowabandoned exclusion, officials had to decide whether someone was gay
in order to decide whether they were to be thrown out.36 But the
marriage laws don’t classify on that basis.
The BLAG brief explained:
A marriage between a man and a woman would fall within
DOMA’s definition even if one or both spouses were homosexual.
Similarly, the marriage of two men would fall outside the
definition even if both were heterosexual. There is no question,
however, that DOMA has a disproportionate impact on
individuals with a homosexual orientation.37

The concession in the last sentence of course conceded nothing
important. Rather, it characterized the legal claim against DOMA as a
clear loser. Disproportionate impact does not trigger heightened
scrutiny. Even for African Americans, the group that receives the
highest level of constitutional protection against discrimination,
disparate impact, without more, does not state a constitutional claim.38
In order to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, state action that does
not employ a suspect classification must be taken “‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”39
A facially neutral law may nonetheless violate equal protection if
the disparate impact reflects a purpose to discriminate. This is not
much help for the cause of same-sex marriage. The Iowa Supreme Court
held that “[t]he benefit denied by the marriage statute—the status of
civil marriage for same-sex couples—is so ‘closely correlated with being
homosexual’ as to make it apparent the law is targeted at gay and
lesbian people as a class.”40 But this is ahistorical fiction. Some facially

35.

See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado
state constitutional measure labeled “No Protected Status Based on
Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation”).

36.

10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006) (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute providing for
discharge of a member of the United States armed forces for unconcealed
homosexuality), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.

37.

BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 25 n.7.

38.

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).

39.

Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

40.

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
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neutral actions do intentionally target gay people,41 and thus
discriminate even if they do not facially classify. But this cannot
reasonably be said of the traditional definition of marriage, which
antedates by millennia the modern conception of homosexuality.42
As for the more recent legislative initiatives—statutory and state
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage—these do not necessarily
reflect a desire to harm gay people as such, or even a disrespectful
devaluation of their interests.43 For many opponents of same-sex
marriage, gay people are marginal to their view of the world. Justice
Alito nicely summarized the position: “marriage is essentially the
solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is
intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not always
do so.”44 Whatever the merits of this notion,45 it is not about gay people.
It is focused on the value of a certain kind of heterosexual union.46 The
existence of gay people is a side issue.47 The function of marriage law,
41.

See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, . . . [i]t
is . . . directed toward gay persons as a class.”); Christian Legal Soc.
Chapter v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (“Our decisions have
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.”); see
also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination . . . .”
(emphasis added)).

42.

The Connecticut Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion by relying
on the state’s civil union law, which placed same-sex couples in a separate
category, rather than ignoring them altogether. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008) (“It is readily apparent,
therefore, that the statutory scheme at issue purposefully and
intentionally distinguishes between same sex and opposite sex couples.”).
But focusing on this produces the strange result that states offering some
accommodation of gay couples violate equal protection, while states
denying any recognition whatsoever do not.

43.

The contrary view is argued in Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus,
and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
Sidebar 204 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/12/Pollvogt-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.-Sidebar-204.pdf.

44.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).

45.

For a critique, see Andrew Koppelman, More Intuition than Argument,
Commonweal, May 3, 2013, at 23 (reviewing Sherif Girgis et al.,
What is Marriage? Man and Woman: A Defense (2012)); Andrew
Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 431.

46.

See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Sex After Christianity, Am. Conservative, Mar.–
Apr. 2013, at 20. Thanks to Maggie Gallagher for calling this article to
my attention.

47.

See Girgis et al., supra note 45, at 10–12, 86–93.
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on this view, is to protect a human good that gay people happen to be
unable to realize: marriage laws do not discriminate against them any
more than art museums discriminate against blind people. The Court,
Scalia wrote in Romer, should not be “verbally disparaging as bigotry
adherence to traditional attitudes.”48 If the core of equal protection is
the right to be treated as an equal, then it is not obvious that this right
is violated by these laws.49

II. But It Is a Sex-Based Classification
In a footnote of its brief, BLAG stated that “DOMA classifies based
on whether a marriage is . . . between two persons . . . of the opposite
sex.”50 Here, BLAG was absolutely right. DOMA’s definition was a sexbased classification. Such a classification was unconstitutional absent
an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”51 Such justifications, in the
context of discrimination against same-sex couples, evidently are hard
to come by.52
All discrimination against gay people is sex discrimination for the
same reason that discrimination against members of interracial couples
is race discrimination. The fact that a person is sexually attracted to
women might trigger discrimination, depending on the target’s sex. So
even the military exclusion, now repealed, turns out, on analysis, to be
a kind of sex discrimination.53 But this analysis was unnecessary with
DOMA, which used a sex-based classification on its face.
48.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

49.

DOMA, which lashed out wildly at gay people, presented a different
case. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to
Overturn DOMA, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 131 (2013), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/12/LRColl2013n12
Koppelman.pdf; Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the
Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1997).

50.

BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 25 n.7.

51

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).

52.

It is conceivable (though unlikely) that a court could decide that the
goods associated with heterosexual marriage provide such a justification.
See Girgis et al., supra note 45. That position would be far more
coherent than the claim that a law targeting same-sex couples is not a
sex-based classification.

53.

I have argued this for years. See Koppelman, supra note 14, at 146–76;
Andrew Koppelman, Sexual Disorientation, 100 Geo. L.J. 1083 (2012);
Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 Drake L. Rev.
923, 945–49 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy in
Europe, or, Lisa Grant Meets Adolf Hitler, in Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and
International Law 623 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs, eds.,
2001); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument
for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
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Windsor presented exactly the same situation as Frontiero and
Wiesenfeld. Had Edith Windsor been a man instead of a woman, the
tax exclusion would automatically have been granted. The classification
was sex-based because the state official had to determine what sex she
was in order to decide how to treat her.
Justices Ginsburg and Kennedy noticed this in the oral argument
in Hollingsworth v. Perry,54 the California same-sex marriage case that
was dismissed for lack of standing on the day that Windsor was
decided.55 In Windsor itself, Justice Alito wrote in his dissenting opinion

519 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994)
[hereinafter Koppelman, Why Discrimination]; Andrew Koppelman, Note,
The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 Yale
L.J. 145 (1988) [hereinafter Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation
Analogy].
54.

133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

55.

Here is the transcript:
[MR. COOPER:] The issues, the constitutional issues that have
been presented to the Court, are not of first impression here. In
Baker v. Nelson, this Court unanimously dismissed for want of a
substantial Federal question.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Cooper, Baker v. Nelson was 1971.
The Supreme Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based
classifications get any kind of heightened scrutiny.
MR. COOPER: That is—
JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the same-sex intimate conduct was
considered criminal in many States in 1971, so I don’t think we
can extract much in Baker v. Nelson.
MR. COOPER: Well, Your Honor, certainly I acknowledge the
precedential limitations of a summary dismissal. But Baker v.
Nelson also came fairly fast on the heels of the Loving decision.
And, Your Honor, I simply make the observation that it seems
implausible in the extreme, frankly, for nine justices to have—to
have seen no substantial Federal question if it is true, as the
Respondents maintain, that the traditional definition of marriage
insofar as—insofar as it does not include same-sex couples, insofar
as it is a gender definition is irrational and can only be explained,
can only be explained, as a result of anti-gay malice and a bare
desire to harm.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you believe this can be treated as a
gender-based classification?
MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I—
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It’s a difficult question that I’ve been
trying to wrestle with it.
MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. And we do not. We do not
think it is properly viewed as a gender-based classification.
Virtually every appellate court, State and Federal, with one
exception, Hawaii, in a superseded opinion, has agreed that it is
not a gender-based classification, but I guess it is gender-based in
the sense that marriage itself is a gendered institution, a gendered
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that Windsor sought “a holding that enshrines in the Constitution a
particular understanding of marriage under which the sex of the
partners makes no difference.”56
A few judges have accepted the sex discrimination argument for
same-sex marriage,57 but many more have rejected it. The argument
that is always made is that there is no sex-based classification because
persons of both sexes are equally forbidden to marry a person of the
same sex.58 Sex discrimination challenges to DOMA were rejected on
term, and so in the same way that fatherhood is gendered more
motherhood is gendered, it’s gendered in that sense.
But we—we agree that to the extent that the classification
impacts, as it clearly does, same-sex couples, that—that
classification can be viewed as being one of sexual orientation
rather than –
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–14, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (Mar. 26, 2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 1212745 at *12–15. Note
how, at the end of the exchange, Cooper tries to argue that a law that
has a disparate impact on same-sex couples is a sexual orientation
classification. That is an obvious misstatement of equal protection law.
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. On the possible attractions
of the sex discrimination argument for Justice Kennedy, see Sonja West,
What is Anthony Kennedy Thinking?, Slate (June 12,
2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2013/06/anthony_kennedy_s_gay_marriage_views_the
_supreme_court_justice_may_see_banning.single.html.
56.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting).

57.

E.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013)
(dictum); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 29–30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971–73
(Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
905–07 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743,
at *5 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64–
67 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d
963, 1037–39 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (Bridge, J., concurring in dissent).
See also Terveer v. Billington, 2014 WL 1280301 at *9 (D.D.C. 2014)
(holding that discrimination against gay employee is based on
nonconformity with sex stereotypes).

58.

E.g., Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 at *7 (D. Or. 2014) (“Men
and women are prohibited from doing the exact same thing: marrying an
individual of the same gender.”); Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 at *15
(D. Idaho 2014) (“[T]wo men have no more right to marry under Idaho
law than two women. In other words, Idaho’s Marriage Laws are facially
gender neutral and there is no evidence that they were motivated by a
gender discriminatory purpose.”); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d
996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012) (“The laws at issue here are not directed toward
persons of any particular gender . . . .”); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F.
Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012) (the marriage prohibition “is genderneutral on its face; it prohibits men and women equally from marrying a
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the same basis.59 The argument is inconsistent with binding Supreme
Court precedent, which rejected a structurally identical argument in
the context of race,60 but set that aside. Imagine a different, equally
symmetrical statute, forbidding persons of both sexes to perform a job
“traditionally performed by the other sex.”61 Or here’s another: “a
statute that required courts to give custody of male children to fathers
member of the same-sex”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–11 (“[w]omen
and men are treated alike—they are permitted to marry people of the
opposite sex, but not people of their own sex”); In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 436 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he challenged marriage statutes do not
treat men and women differently.”), superseded by constitutional
amendment, Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 597–98
(Md. 2007) (finding that the state ERA is not implicated unless a statute
grants “rights to men or women as a class, to the exclusion of an entire
subsection of similarly situated members of the opposite sex”); Andersen,
138 P.3d at 988 (“Men and women are treated identically” when samesex marriage is prohibited); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675,
706–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the opposite-sex marriage
requirement is a law that “merely mentions gender,” treats both sexes
equally, and so is not discriminatory), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384, 436 (Cal.
2008); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13 (“[E]ach sex is equally prohibited from
precisely the same conduct.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 363 n.2 (D.C. App. 1995) (Steadman, J., concurring) (“The marriage
statute applies equally to men and women.”); Phillips v. Wisconsin Pers.
Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 127–28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
woman with female partner was not discriminated against because men
with male partners were similarly denied benefits); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71
(Heen, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll males and females are treated alike.”); see
also Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (citing a “clear
distinction” without explaining what it is), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191–92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(indicating that the discrimination is based not on sex but on the
definition of marriage). The Latta v. Otter court also deemed it significant
that “the Supreme Court has not equated sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination despite several opportunities to do
so,” 2014 WL 2054264 at *15. However, it is familiar doctrine that a Court
does not reject an argument on the merits when it simply finds it
unnecessary to address it.
59.

See, e.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 877 (C.D. Cal.
2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded with directions to
dismiss for lack of standing, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v.
Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“DOMA does not
discriminate on the basis of sex because it treats women and men
equally.”); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004)
(“Women, as members of one class, are not being treated differently from
men, as members of a different class.”).

60.

Even a law student could figure this out. See Koppelman, Note, The
Miscegenation Analogy, supra note 53, at 147.

61.

Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation
Analogy, 34 Rutgers L.J. 107, 143 (2002).
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and female children to mothers.”62 By the argument’s logic, these laws
do not impose sex-based classifications. Stephen Clark has observed:
The semantic trick is simply to avoid talking about the sex-based
differential in concrete terms of what opportunities women and
men are allowed and, instead, to embed that very differential in
the supposed single standard, which is recast as a uniformly
applicable formula that allocates opportunities to “everyone” by
making everyone’s opportunities turn, in the but-for sense, on
what their sex happens to be.63

Another strategy for rejecting the sex discrimination argument is
importing into the equal protection analysis elements that do not
belong there—either a rule that “separate but equal” does not violate
equal protection,64 or a rule that sex classifications are permissible
unless the challenger shows that they were adopted with the purpose
of subordinating women.65 Neither of these has ever been adopted by
the Supreme Court, and both are inconsistent with well-settled
precedents. To make matters worse, the courts rejecting the sex
discrimination arguments have often relied on sex-based stereotypes to
justify the denial of marriage to same-sex couples: that men and women
provide distinct role models for children, that the two sexes have
complementary roles in marriage, that marriage is a remedy for male
62.

Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 n.10 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

63.

Clark, supra note 61, at 144.

64.

Clark shows that this is a rule that has implicitly been accepted in some
sex discrimination cases, but only where the burden is a trivial one, such
as a requirement that men and women use separate toilets. It will not
work here unless it can be shown that the partner you want is fungible
with the partner that the state wants you to have. Id. at 174–84. What
the California Supreme Court said about race is equally applicable here:
“A member of any of these races may find himself barred by law from
marrying the person of his choice and that person to him may be
irreplaceable. Human beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine
that would make them as interchangeable as trains.” Perez v. Lippold,
198 P.2d 17, 25 (Cal. 1948).

65.

Clark, supra note 61, at 147–53. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp.
2d 939, 961 (2013). Justice Scalia so argues in his response to the sex
discrimination argument in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599–600
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is right that a discriminatory
purpose is sufficient to subject “a facially neutral law that makes no
mention of race” to strict scrutiny. Id. at 600. But this does not
distinguish the miscegenation laws, which were not facially neutral. If
challengers had this burden, they would be able to satisfy it, because the
homosexuality taboo is, as a matter of cultural fact, closely tied to the
subordination of women. See Koppelman, Why Discrimination, supra
note 53, at 234–73.
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irresponsibility.66 So, far from justifying laws under intermediate
scrutiny, these are the very illicit motives that intermediate scrutiny is
trying to detect.
Courts have gone to great lengths to resist the sex discrimination
argument, which they have regarded as “counterintuitive and
legalistic.”67 The resistance is puzzling. Any law that discriminates
against gay people classifies on the basis of sex, and until recently
sodomy laws criminalized some conduct for one sex but not for the
other.68 It is hard to understand how this aggressive policing of the
boundaries of gender could be imagined to have nothing to do with
sex discrimination.
The Court could have disposed of Windsor on sex discrimination
grounds. Why didn’t it do that? This would have been doctrinally tidy
and would not have required the Court to craft any new law. On the
other hand, it would have reached the question that the Court avoided
in Perry, effectively declaring the presumptive invalidity of every law
in the country denying same-sex couples the right to marry. The Court
was not eager to reach that issue.69

III. Beyond Levels of Scrutiny
Instead, the Court relied on a line of cases that hold that a law is
invalid if it reflects a “bare desire to harm” a politically unpopular
group. None of these cases say what level of scrutiny is being applied.
It seems to be minimal, rational basis scrutiny, yet it is rational basis
“with bite.” These cases puzzle scholars.70

66.

This is extensively documented in Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 Harv. J.L.
& Gender 461 (2007).

67.

Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wisc. 2014).

68.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

69.

See Andrew Koppelman, Salvaging Perry, 125 Harv. L. Rev. F. 69
(2012). This was emphasized in an amicus brief that I coauthored. See
Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr., Rebecca L. Brown, Daniel
A. Farber, and Andrew Koppelman in Support of Respondents,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (Feb. 28, 2013) (No. 12-144), 2013
WL 840011 (advocating for an application of equal protection similar to
the Ninth Circuit’s equal protection analysis).

70.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and
Policies 704–06 (4th ed. 2011) (attempting to reconcile cases scrutinized
under rational basis “with bite” with cases decided according to
traditional rational basis scrutiny); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational
Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer
v. Evans, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 357–58 (1999) (noting that the cases that
have been scrutinized under rational basis “with bite” do not seem to
exhibit an obvious pattern).
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Is it appropriate thus to discard the scheme of levels of scrutiny? It
depends on the reasons for using that judge-made device in the
first place.
The Court has repeatedly explained:
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The
test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal
so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for
the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.71

The bare desire to harm cases, which I examine in this Part, bypass
that heuristic in a few rare cases where the device is unnecessary for
inferring such a purpose. In those cases, the Court adopted a different
heuristic.
Illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotypes are illegitimate because
they devalue the interests of some citizens, treating them as less than
full members of the community. Paul Brest observes that one way in
which equal protection can be violated is for state actions to reflect
“racially selective sympathy and indifference,” meaning “the
unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of
humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter
of course to one’s own group.”72 John Hart Ely argues that in order for
legislation to be legitimate, the citizens must all “be represented in the
sense that their interests are not to be left out of account or valued
negatively in the lawmaking process.”73 Racial prejudice is one driver
of that devaluation. But it is hardly the only one. That is why the
Equal Protection Clause does not only forbid racial discrimination.

71.

City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (same).

72.

Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1976).

73.

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 223 n.33 (1980). Legislation on the basis of stereotyping violates
this constraint by massively overgeneralizing: “[T]o disadvantage—in the
perceived service of some overriding social goal—a thousand persons that a
more individualized (but more costly) test or procedure would exclude,
under the impression that only five hundred fit that description, is to deny
the five hundred to whose existence you are oblivious their right to equal
concern and respect, by valuing their welfare at zero.” Id. at 157. The theory
of equal respect in decision making that these authors rely upon is
elaborated and defended in Koppelman, supra note 14, at 13–56, and
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 89, 101–03 (1997) [hereinafter Koppelman, Invidious Intent].
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Certain legislative classifications are so closely associated with
prejudice that courts presume an illegitimate purpose. But there are
other ways to infer such a purpose. One is to consider whether the law’s
“purported justifications” make “no sense in light of how the
[government has] treated other groups similarly situated in relevant
respects.”74 If that is the case, the Court can reasonably infer that the
basis of the law is “irrational prejudice.”75 The bare desire to harm cases
show another path to the same conclusion.
The first of these is USDA v. Moreno.76 The Court invalidated a
1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 196477 that excluded from
participation in the food stamp program any member of a household
whose members are not all related to each other.78 Congress, the
legislative history showed, was attempting to prevent “hippie
communes” from receiving any stamps.79 The Court—after finding that
the law did not fit any of the purposes cited in its defense—held that
this purpose (which the government did not argue for) could not
provide the needed rational basis: “[I]f the constitutional concept of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”80 The law
in Moreno had no purpose other than to keep federal benefits out of
the hands of a group Congress did not like. The Court, however, did
not decide that this was the purpose of the law. Rather, if this
impermissible purpose was excluded, the law had no purpose at all.
Moreno became relevant to the gay rights question in Romer v.
Evans,81 which struck down an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution—referred to on the ballot as Amendment 2—declaring
that neither the state nor any of its subdivisions could prohibit
discrimination on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”82 The Amendment,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court observed, “has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
74.

Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001).

75.

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.

76.

413 U.S. 528 (1973).

77.

Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–
2033 (2012)).

78.

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.

79.

Id. at 534.

80.

Id. This language is quoted in part in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).

81.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

82.

Id. at 624 (quoting Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
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named group.”83 The Amendment seemed to “deprive[ ] gays and
lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit
arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.”84 The
Court concluded that “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.”85 Quoting Moreno, it found that the broad disability imposed on
a targeted group
raise[d] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. “[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”86

Romer’s holding may thus be summarized:
[I]f a law targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon
it disabilities that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no
discernible relationship to any legitimate governmental interest,
then the Court will infer that the law’s purpose is simply to harm
that group, and so will invalidate the law.87

It remains to consider whether the Court properly applied this rule
to DOMA.

IV. DOMA, Bare Desire to Harm,
and Reckless Indifference
DOMA cut off federal benefits to a targeted, politically unpopular
group, just like the law in Moreno, and it did so in a remarkably broad
and undifferentiated way, just like the law in Romer.
DOMA’s definitional provision and the amendment invalidated in
Romer have telling similarities. Like the Colorado amendment, this
provision “identifie[d] persons by a single trait [membership in a samesex marriage] and then denies them protection across the board.”88 For
the first time in American history, DOMA created a set of second-class
marriages, valid under state law but void for all federal purposes. The
83.

Id. at 632.

84.

Id. at 630.

85.

Id. at 635.

86.

Id. at 634 (quoting USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).

87.

Koppelman, supra note 34, at 8; Koppelman, Invidious Intent, supra note 73,
at 94. The Court is also evidently influenced by its knowledge of a group’s
political unpopularity, but many of these decisions do not mention that.

88.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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exclusion of a class of valid state marriages from all federal recognition
is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”89
What could justify this broad disability?
Justice Scalia offered this: “DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law
issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of
marriage.”90 What happens, he asked, to the marriage of a couple who
wed in New York and move to Alabama? “DOMA avoided all of this
uncertainty by specifying which marriages would be recognized for
federal purposes.”91 Chief Justice Roberts likewise cited “[i]nterests in
uniformity and stability.”92
But federal laws and regulations already dealt with those questions,
which will still arise with underage marriages, cousin marriages,
common-law marriages, and the like.93 Federal agencies have routinely
addressed these situations for more than a century.94 Justice Scalia did
not explain why same-sex marriage is any different.
More important is the question of the proportionality of the
response. These conflict of laws problems are rare. That is why, for a
long time, almost no one has noticed that federal law is often unclear
about what state’s law to apply to determine marriage for federal

89.

Id.

90.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2708 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also claims that
“DOMA’s definitional section was enacted to ensure that state-level
experimentation did not automatically alter the basic operation of federal
law.” Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is circular: that law’s
operation changes in just the same way—incorporating new couples into
the existing structure—whenever a marriage takes place, regardless of the
gender of the spouses.

93.

For example, the Social Security Act states, “An applicant is the wife,
husband, widow, or widower . . . if the courts of the State in which such
insured individual is domiciled . . . would find that such applicant and such
insured individual were validly married . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i)
(2006). The Veterans’ Benefits Act directs that “[i]n determining whether or
not a person is or was the spouse of a veteran, their marriage shall be proven
as valid . . . according to the law of the place where the parties resided at the
time of the marriage or the law of the place where the parties resided when
the right to benefits accrued.” 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). The Family and
Medical Leave Act operates similarly. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.122(b) (2013)
(defining spouse under the Family and Medical Leave Act as “a husband or
wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the
State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States
where it is recognized”).

94.

See Brief of Dr. Donna E. Shalala et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 13–29, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307) (collecting cases).

1062

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
Beyond Levels of Scrutiny

purposes.95 In a country with thousands of same-sex marriages,
remarkably few such cases have actually arisen.96
DOMA’s blunderbuss response was to withhold recognition from all
of these marriages, even that overwhelming majority of marriages in
which the couple never changes their home, and in which no conflict of
laws problem arises.
Same-sex spouses could not file joint tax returns.97 Pre-tax dollars
could not be used to pay for health insurance or health care expenses
for a same-sex spouse or that spouse’s dependent children.98 A samesex spouse’s debts incurred under divorce decrees or separation
agreements were dischargeable in bankruptcy, unlike similar debts
owed to an opposite-sex spouse.99 Same-sex spouses of federal employees
were excluded from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,100
the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program,101 and the
Federal Employees Compensation Act, which compensates the widow
or widower of an employee killed in the performance of duty.102 Samesex spouses were the only surviving widows and widowers who would
not have automatic ownership rights in a copyrighted work after the
author’s death.103 Same-sex spouses were denied preferential treatment
under immigration law and, therefore, were the only legally married
spouses of American citizens who faced deportation.104 It is a federal

95.

William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes,
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (2012), which Justice Scalia cites in Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting), is an impressive work of scholarship, but
revealingly, the issue it raises had been neglected for decades. See Baude,
supra, at 1373–74. Unlike Justice Scalia, Baude does not suggest that these
problems justify DOMA.

96.

I’ve been on the lookout for them since I wrote Same Sex, Different States:
When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines (2006). Because same-sex
couples’ strongest claims will be based on unfair surprise, this is not a
kind of test case that can be planned. Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of
Strategic Litigation, 17 L. & Sexuality 1, 2 (2008).

97.

See 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2012).

98.

See id. § 105(b).

99.

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2012).

100. See 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5) (2012).
101. See id. § 8701(d)(1)(A).
102. See id. § 8101(6), (11).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(C)(ii) (2012).
104. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay
Couples, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2009, at A19 (explaining proposed
legislation to give same-sex partners of American citizens and legal
immigrants residency in the United States); Editorial, Reunite This
Family, Bos. Globe, Aug. 27, 2007, at A8 (observing that a Brazilian
citizen was forced to seek asylum because his same-sex marriage to an
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crime to assault, kidnap, or kill a member of the immediate family of a
federal official in order to influence or retaliate against that official—
but it was not if you did that to a same-sex spouse.105 With the end of
the exclusion of gay people from the military,106 DOMA made it official
policy to withhold any survivor’s benefits from the surviving spouse of
a soldier killed in the line of duty.107 And so on.
Once every few years, DOMA might have simplified some federal
bureaucrat’s job. Everyone else was saddled with enormous burdens.108
Thousands of employers in states that recognize same-sex marriage
were required to maintain two separate administrative regimes for
benefits—one handling federal benefits affected by DOMA, and another
to comply with state law. Mapping the border between those two
regimes was so complex that the task has begotten a small industry of
compliance specialists—expensive professionals whose work is a
deadweight loss for the American economy. A group of 278 employers
and organizations, in an amicus brief to the Court, explained:
Some amici have had to pay vendors to reprogram benefits and
payroll systems, to add coding to reconcile different tax and
benefit treatments, to reconfigure at every benefit and coverage
level, and to revisit all of these modifications with every change
in tax or ERISA laws for potential DOMA impact. . . . Benefits
and human resources departments, facing questions from
employees with same-sex spouses regarding workplace benefit
selections and coverage, must be adequately trained and prepared
to explain the disparate treatment to employees who may later
realize (perhaps too late) that their benefits choices and decisions
carried unanticipated and significant financial implications.109

Even large employers were overwhelmed. Yale University had to tell its
employees that, because of a programming error, it had failed to
withhold taxes for the imputed value of health coverage for same-sex
American citizen was not recognized by the United States government
when it came to immigration).
105. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(A) (2006)).
106. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 124 Stat.
3515.
107. See 10 U.S.C. § 1447(9) (2012).
108. Burdens on third parties, other than those facially targeted by a statute,
are not normally a part of equal protection analysis. They are, however,
relevant to an assessment of a law’s rationality. Thanks to Bob Bennett
for helpful conversation on this issue.
109. Brief of 278 Employers and Organizations Representing Employers as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 28,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Feb. 27, 2013) (No. 12-307).
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spouses in 2010, resulting in extra deductions in 2011.110 Because state
antidiscrimination laws protect many gay employees, the employer had
to determine, at its own risk, where DOMA did and did not supersede
state law.
DOMA did not even “eas[e] administrative burdens”111 for
government actors. For example, it created fiendishly complex problems
for bankruptcy courts, which must deal with property rights created by
marriages recognized under state law (which, of course, DOMA could
not annul without running afoul of the Takings Clause) while somehow
withholding recognition for federal purposes.112
DOMA deemed the interest in nonrecognition of same-sex couples
to be so overridingly urgent as to justify sacrificing a huge range of
other government interests, some of the highest order. Bankruptcy
courts could not accomplish efficient and predictable adjudication.
Government employees could not insure their dependents. The Social
Security survivor benefits program, “‘the primary purpose [of which] is
to pay benefits in accordance with the probable needs of the
beneficiaries,’”113 could not accomplish this goal. Retirees could not
provide for the security of their dependent spouses. Income taxation
could not account for family obligations. National safety itself was
compromised because the military could not provide its members’
families with healthcare, housing, and survivorship benefits that are
essential to military effectiveness.114
Other conflict of law solutions were available. The most obvious
ones are those based on the place of celebration or the domicile of the
couple (which, for many couples, are the same state, so the choice
between these rules makes no difference).115 Blanket nonrecognition is
such an extraordinary overreaction that even the Jim Crow South did
not adopt it with respect to interracial marriage.116

110. Tara Siegel Bernard, Yale Payroll Error Gives Gay Employees a
New Year Surprise, N.Y. Times Bucks Blog (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:45 PM),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/yale-payroll-error-costs-gay
-employees-thousands/.
111. BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 34.
112. See Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881, 883 (2006).
113. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644 (1975) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 728, at 7 (1939)).
114. See Brief of Hon. Lawrence J. Korb et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent Windsor on the Merits Question at 3, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (Mar. 1, 2013) (No. 12-307).
115. Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When SameSex Marriages Cross State Lines 82–96 (2006).
116. See id. at 28–50.
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Note what DOMA did not do. Justice Kennedy claimed that
Congress’s purpose was “to influence or interfere with state sovereign
choices.”117 Justice Alito sensibly responded that DOMA “does not
prevent any State from recognizing same-sex marriage or from
extending to same-sex couples any right, privilege, benefit, or obligation
stemming from state law.”118 There is no evidence that DOMA
influenced any state’s decision whether to adopt same-sex marriage,
and it is hard to imagine how it could have.119
But Congress’s helplessness cut against the law’s reasonableness.
DOMA was often defended as manifesting moral opposition to samesex marriage—which, we have stipulated, is a constitutionally
permissible purpose. But that purpose cannot justify a statute that does
not promote that end in any significant way. The question before
Congress was not whether same-sex marriages would exist. It was
undisputed that Congress had no power to answer that question, which
is reserved to the states.120 The real issue was whether to have a set of
second-class marriages, denied recognition for all federal purposes, even
in contexts in which the whole purpose of the federal classification is
defeated by not recognizing the marriage.
A law will fail even rational basis review if the “purported
justifications” make “no sense in light of how the [government has] treated
other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.”121 DOMA does,
however, very effectively “tell[ ] [same-sex] couples, and all the world, that
their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”122
117. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
118. Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting).
119. It is unclear from the legislative history whether Congress intended to
influence states’ deliberations on whether to recognize same-sex
marriages. The House Judiciary Committee report says repeatedly that
each state will remain free to decide this policy issue for itself. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 at 3, 17, 24 (1996). The report also indicates,
however, that the legislation will provide “assistance” to those states that
have no declared public policy against recognition of same-sex marriage.
See id. at 10 n.33.
120. That is one reason why Paul Clement’s argument, on behalf of the House
Republicans—nonrecognition is rational because it somehow makes
heterosexual couples more likely to marry when unexpected pregnancy
occurs—makes so little sense that it was ignored even by Scalia and Alito.
See BLAG Brief, supra note 11, at 47–48. Even if this convoluted causal
chain is accepted, DOMA doesn’t prevent any same-sex marriages from
occurring. For the same reason, even if one accepts Justice Alito’s view
that there is a legitimate moral view that objects to same-sex marriage as
such, that premise can’t justify DOMA. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718
(Alito, J., dissenting).
121. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 n.4 (2001) (per
Rehnquist, C.J.; Scalia, J., in majority).
122. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
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The relevant legislative purpose here is not precisely desire to harm.
It is more like what the Model Penal Code has in mind when it refers
to homicide “committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”123 In such cases, death
is caused by “the intentional doing of an uncalled-for act in callous
disregard of its likely harmful effects on others.”124 One element in
determining extreme indifference is the social utility of the conduct:
speeding through crowded streets for the thrill of it is a paradigmatic
case, but doing that to carry a passenger who needs emergency surgery
to the hospital may not be a crime at all.125
Given current doctrine, can extreme indifference constitute an
equal protection violation? The answer is that it can when a group is
singled out for unprecedentedly harsh treatment. It is true that, as we
already noted, disparate impact does not violate equal protection unless
the challenged action was taken “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”126 Doesn’t that mean
that extreme indifference raises no constitutional difficulty?
But the disparate impact cases need to be put in perspective. From
the standpoint of equal protection theory, a standard that tolerates
extreme indifference makes no sense for the reasons we just considered.127
The better explanation for this doctrine is that full judicial enforcement
of equal protection is institutionally impossible. The Court was unwilling
to hold that disparate impact, without more, creates a presumption of
unconstitutionality because such a rule “would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public
service, regulatory, and licensing statutes . . . .”128 This argument is not
about the scope of equal protection but rather the consequences of
judicial intervention. Some constitutional provisions, notably the Equal
Protection Clause, are judicially underenforced because of the Court’s
concern about institutional limitations of this kind.129
123. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (1980).
124. Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 449 (Pa. 1946), quoted in
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries
23 (1980).
125. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.4(a), at 439
(2d ed. 2003).
126. Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
127. The defects of the Feeney standard are explained in David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
935, 962–64 (1989).
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
129. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1214–20 (1978). The same
concern about the Court’s institutional limitations dominate Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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What the Court needs is a rule for detecting illicit purpose that
respects those limitations. Strict scrutiny is one such rule. The bare
desire to harm cases, which I examinee in detail in Part III, bypass that
heuristic in unusual cases where the device is unnecessary for inferring
such a purpose. In those cases, the Court adopted a different heuristic:
the fact that a group is singled out for an unprecedentedly harsh
treatment. When that happens, the Court will presume that what is
going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral disapproval.130
That rule evidently was relied upon, sub silentio, in Windsor.
Moreno and Romer invalidated laws for lacking a rational basis,
but any statute’s terms suggest a purpose that the statute rationally
serves.131 A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on Tuesdays
is rationally—indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of preventing
blue Volkswagens from being driven on Tuesdays. The real issue is
whether some goals are impermissible or too costly to be worth
pursuing, a question that cannot be answered on the basis of
“rationality.”132 David Hume famously wrote: “‘Tis not contrary to
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of
my finger.”133 But that’s not the sense of rationality that the Court
relied on, or should rely on.
Windsor clarifies what can count as a bare desire to harm. A
demand that harm be the ultimate goal of the state’s action would be
preposterously difficult to satisfy. Windsor indicates that the
Constitution is violated when a group is deliberately singled out for
broad harm for the sake of an insignificant benefit. Singled out: this is
not a matter of unintended impact.134 In that context, extreme
indifference is a constitutional harm that has a remedy. There is no
duty to aid a starving infant, but neither may one hurl it through the
window in order to get into one’s house.
130. That principle evidently also influenced the outcome in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the Court invalidated a criminal
prohibition of homosexual sex. See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s
Penumbra, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1171, 1179 (2004).
131. See Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1056–
57 (1979); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 345–47 (1949); Robert F. Nagel, Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123,
124 (1972).
132. Bennett, supra note 13131, at 1078.
133. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 416 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., 1888) (1739–40).
134. The difference here is analogous to the Takings Clause rule that while
state action merely diminishing the value of one’s land is not a taking—
adverse impact is not enough—any state occupation of even a tiny portion
of that land must be compensated.
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Recall that a finding of extreme indifference for murder depends on
an assessment of the utility of the defendant’s conduct.135 The exact same
behavior will or will not be criminally negligent depending on the value
of its object. To trigger liability, it is not necessary that the conduct have
no value whatsoever. It really can be thrilling to speed down a crowded
street, and pleasure is not valueless. But anyone who thinks that the
pleasure is worth it—who endangers others “for his diversion merely”136—
manifests a “depraved mind, regardless of human life.”137
Windsor’s conclusion that DOMA was irrational implicitly relied
on a similar proportionality analysis. That analysis is only a minor
theme in strict scrutiny, though it has some role: the interest in question
has to be a truly compelling one. The analysis balances cost and
benefit.138 Stephen Siegel has shown that cost justification was the
original point of strict scrutiny, which was later transformed into a
device for discerning illicit motive.139 That shift was led by John Hart
Ely, who thought it inappropriate for judges to second-guess
legislatures’ policy decisions.140 Ely’s caution about judicial
policymaking is sensible, and the modern Court evidently shares it.141
But deference is not necessarily unlimited. If the benefit is trivial by
comparison with the cost, then it is appropriate to infer that the
decision has an improper purpose.142
DOMA’s purpose was to convey a message of disdain for gay
couples, with extreme indifference to the human costs. As with the

135. See supra notes 123–23 and accompanying text.
136. Brown v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W. 220, 221 (Ky. 1891).
137. State v. Thompson, 558 P.2d 202, 205 (Wash. 1977).
138. The Court explained:
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because
of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls
squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection . . . . The application of strict
scrutiny . . . determines whether a compelling governmental
interest justifies the infliction of that injury.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229–30 (1995).
139 Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and
Strict Scrutiny, 48 Am. J. Legal Hist. 355, 393–401 (2006).
140. Id. at 397–401.
141. Most of the time, anyway. Its hostility to racial classifications, when these
could not possibly reflect biased decision making, frankly rests on policy
objections about the bad consequences of using such classifications. See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
746 (2007).
142. Even Ely concedes this. Ely, supra note 73, at 147–48.
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“heart void of social duty”143 characteristic of extreme indifference
murder, this took DOMA outside the range of reasonable disagreement.
To say that the tiny administrative inconvenience cited by Scalia is
sufficient to justify the enormous burden on gay couples and their
employers is crazy. It’s like strangling the baby because you can’t
decide what to name it.

V. Distracted by Federalism
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor would have been sounder if he had
simply relied on Romer. But instead he felt the need to talk about
federalism, for reasons that mystified his fellow judges.144
He oddly fetishized state law: “The State’s decision to give this
class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and
status of immense import.”145 The State said, let there be dignity for
same-sex couples. And there was dignity. Excuse me, but I thought
that same-sex couples had a dignity and status of immense import
whether or not the state saw fit to recognize it. Kennedy himself writes
that the failure to recognize same-sex couples was seen as “an unjust
exclusion,” and that this perception was “a new insight.”146
The best sympathetic reconstruction of Kennedy’s logic is Randy
Barnett’s analysis: it was the fact that the states had recognized samesex marriage that generated a protected liberty interest giving rise to
heightened scrutiny.147 This gesture toward state law is part of a more
general trend in Kennedy’s jurisprudence, toward trying to find some
objective referent on which to base judgments about the contours of
the unenumerated rights that are protected by the Constitution.148
If Barnett is right, then state law is a constraint on the exercise of
federal power.149 For example, it might call into question federal

143. State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 111, 121 (1857).
144. Chief Justice Roberts was not mystified, but used the emphasis on
federalism to try to shield state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage from
constitutional challenge. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2696–97 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2681 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 2689.
147. Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision,
Scotusblog (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p
=166116.
148. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (Kennedy, J.)
(invalidating juvenile death penalty on the basis of evolving national
consensus).
149. Justice Kennedy declares that “it is unnecessary to decide whether this
federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because
it disrupts the federal balance.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. But if
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marijuana prohibitions, which operate in the teeth of state efforts to
legalize the distribution of the drug.150 It has been suggested that this
was a way for the Court to exercise judicial modesty, by avoiding the
charged question of whether states could confine marriage to differentsex couples.151 But a pure Romer approach, of the kind offered here,
would also have avoided that. As Barnett recognizes, the implications
of Kennedy’s federalism-based approach are hardly modest. If
Kennedy’s invocation of federalism is taken seriously, then the Court is
back in the pre–New Deal business of policing the purposes for which
the enumerated powers are exercised, to make sure that they do not
interfere with matters that are reserved to the states.152 And if so, then
a lot of other federal programs are in trouble. It was on that basis that
the early twentieth-century Court struck down minimum wage and
child labor laws.153
If federal definitions of marriage must track state law, it is also
unclear which state law they should track when these conflict. After
Windsor, the Internal Revenue Service adopted a place-of-celebration
rule for tax purposes, creating a class of couples whose marriages are
recognized by federal law but not by their domiciles.154 Thus, gay
couples in Mississippi could have their marriages recognized for federal
purposes so long as they are willing to make a quick trip to New York
Barnett is right, then this is a distinction without a difference: Kennedy’s
liberty-focused analysis is parasitic on federalism concerns.
150. Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision,
Volokh Conspiracy (June 26, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2013/06/26/federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/.
151. Rick Pildes, Why Justice Kennedy’s DOMA Opinion Has the Unique
Legal Structure It Has, Balkinization (June 26, 2013, 1:34 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/why-justice-kennedys-doma-opinion
-has.html.
152. See Andrew Koppelman, The Tough Luck Constitution and the
Assault on Health Care Reform 52–56 (2013). This is, of course, a
result that Barnett would welcome. See id. at 80–90. On the other hand,
Barnett is admirably immune from the state worship that possesses
Justice Kennedy.
153. Linda Greenhouse noted the dangers in the federalism argument before
Justice Kennedy adopted it. Trojan Horse, N.Y. Times Opinionator
(Apr. 3, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/
03/trojan-horse/.
154. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. A bill under congressional
consideration would create the same rule throughout the United States
Code. Respect for Marriage Act, S. 1236, 113th Cong. (2013). A similar
rule is implied, perhaps inadvertently, by this sentence in Kennedy’s
opinion: “DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State
[Kennedy does not say which!] entitled to recognition and protection to
enhance their own liberty. . . . This opinion and its holding are confined
to those lawful marriages.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96.
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to marry. Fortunately, the Court did not endorse arguments that would
have called this legislation into doubt.

Conclusion
The Court thus appropriately concluded that DOMA was
unconstitutional: “The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”155
The rule implied in the bare desire to harm cases is one with fuzzy
boundaries, and there is plenty of room for disagreement about where
it does and does not apply. It lacks the mechanical clarity of the levelsof-scrutiny approach, which simply asks what kind of classification is
being made. That is why Romer has had little effect in the lower courts,
some of which have simply noted that the Court did not speak of strict
scrutiny and applied the most deferential possible analysis to laws
discriminating against gay people.156 Windsor leaves an even thicker fog
by combining the Romer analysis with an invocation of federalism and
mixing the two analyses incoherently. Justice Scalia correctly observes
that the lower courts will probably find Windsor easy to distinguish
from any case that comes before them in the future.157 As in Romer,
the Court finds an equal protection violation, but its holding is unlikely
to have much effect.
Still, as a matter of pure equal protection theory, these laws were
unconstitutional and the Court was right to get rid of them. Larger
questions were postponed for another day.158 But the equal protection
holding of Windsor is sound.

155. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
156. Kate Girard, The Irrational Legacy of Romer v. Evans: A Decade of
Judicial Review Reveals the Need for Heightened Scrutiny of Legislation
That Denies Equal Protection to Members of the Gay Community, 36
N.M. L. Rev. 565, 574 (2006); William C. Duncan, The Legacy of Romer
v. Evans—So Far, 10 WIDENER J. Pub. L. 161 (2001).
157. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Justice Sotomayor probably spoke for many of the Justices when she
asked: “If the issue is letting the States experiment and letting the society
have more time to figure out its direction, why is taking a case now the
answer?” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 64.
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